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Friday, August 18, 2017

Russia May Be Testing Its GPS Spoofing Capabilities Around The Black Sea

A consensus is building that Russia has been experimenting with the ability to override Global Positioning System signals with fake ones that can severely disrupt and confuse the geolocation abilities of GPS users. For now this phenomenon has mainly affected ships traversing the Black Sea, but during a time of conflict it could impact a wide spectrum of combat systems including drones, missiles, smart bombs, as well as surface combatants and land warfare units. Even manned aircraft may not be immune to such electronic warfare tactics.


This all started on June 22nd when a ship near the Russian port of Novorossiysk reported a major miscalculation with their high-end GPS installation. New Scientist states:
"On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometers inland, at Gelendzhik Airport.
After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected.
While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the first documented use of GPS misdirection – a spoofing attack that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild."
Maritime-executive.com has a more thorough account of the incident you can read here. The commander of the ship that reported the strange occurrence documented it thoroughly.
Russia's large port at Novorossiysk sits at the northern end of the tense Black Sea region, near the Kerch Strait and across from the Russian-held Crimea.  Novorossiysk is a major port for (the) Russia Black Sea Fleet.
As New Scientist points out, GPS spoofing seems to be something Russia has been playing with in a major way before this anomaly occurred in the northern Black Sea region. Reports that GPS users around Moscow, and especially near the Kremlin, have had similar issues, with the peculiar GPS behavior being discovered in a most unusual way:
"Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave. The scale of the problem did not become apparent until people began trying to play Pokemon Go. The fake signal, which seems to center on the Kremlin, relocates anyone nearby to Vnukovo Airport, 32 km away. This is probably for defensive reasons; many NATO guided bombs, missiles and drones rely on GPS navigation, and successful spoofing would make it impossible for them to hit their targets."
Insidegnss.com elaborates further on Russia's affinity for GPS denial tactics:
"With more than 250,000 cell towers in Russia equipped with GPS jamming devices as a defense against attack by U.S. missiles, the country has advanced capabilities to disrupt GPS. There have been press reports of Russian GPS jamming in both Moscow and the Ukraine. In fact Russia has boasted that its capabilities “make aircraft carriers useless,” and the U.S. Director of National Intelligence recently issued a report that stated that Russia and others were focusing on improving their capability to jam U.S. satellite systems, according to the RNT Foundation."
GPS jamming, or the loss of GPS altogether, has long been a major concern of the US military. One highly publicized yet at the same time shadowy drill led to warnings that GPS blackouts and disruptions would emanate from the Mojave Desert and reach hundreds of miles in every direction. Other elaborate testing and systems development programs have increased in frequency and scope regarding operating in GPS denied environments. This includes a cocktail of new technologies that can offer similar geolocation capabilities to GPS without the need for a constellation of satellites above. 
Still, wide-area GPS jamming or outages are easy to detect, but spoofing GPS signals is a much more insidious threat, especially if spoofing effects are localized in nature. New Scientist states:
"...It can now be done with commercial hardware and software downloaded from the Internet. Nor does it require much power. Satellite signals are very weak – about 20 watts from 20,000 miles away – so a one-watt transmitter on a hilltop, plane or drone is enough to spoof everything out to the horizon."
Advanced guidance and navigation systems, like those found on aircraft and in most GPS-guided weapons, use inertial navigation with embedded GPS. System software loaded onto the INS/GPS guidance system uses algorithms to detect discrepancies among various steams of information. This way the system can place less priority on one stream of information, say from a malfunctioning ring-laser gyro or GPS receiver, than others. Or it can discount that steam entirely if it starts straying far from the consensus of the others. This way a navigation system that suddenly loses a component due to failure or has one of its data streams deviate for other reasons won't simply stop working. 
For instance, if the GPS telemetry suddenly leaps miles away, the navigation system may "vote out" the GPS information entirely. The system will be less accurate overall because of it, but it will still function. As an example, take a Joint Direct Attack Munition, the most common guided bomb used by the USAF, which uses GPS and INS navigation. If the system suddenly loses GPS connectivity during its attack sequence, INS will take over, but the bomb will be substantially less accurate than it would have been with both GPS and INS working together as a team. 
JDAM has a tailkit with moving fins, a GPS antenna and a GPS/INS autopilot.
But spoofing isn't as simple as telling a GPS receiver it is somewhere totally different than where it really is. By broadcasting false GPS data that slowly changes over time, navigational systems with GPS and INS may not "throw out" the GPS data so soon, or at all for that matter. Over time this could result in vehicles going far off course or even running into shores, mountains or even other vehicles without warning. Some say this is how the Iranians brought down the RQ-170 Sentinel drone in a relatively intact state in late November 2011, although this remains highly debatable.
As for what emitter or platform that may have caused the disruption, we don't know for sure. But it is interesting to note that a Tu-214SR strategic communications relay aircraft was deployed to Crimea shortly before the incident took place, and has been flying regular circles over the northern Black Sea ever since. It's possible the aircraft is capable of rebroadcasting fake GPS signals aside from its primary duties, or at least is experimenting with the capability in region.  
As you can see, this new form of electronic warfare is powerful and potentially quite deadly. The big question is how or when would Russia use it as a weapon? It seems that it fits well into Moscow's hybrid warfare playbook, as it could disrupt the navigation of unfriendly forces and even impact their ability to target Russian forces. It could also disrupt commerce and air travel all while the hostile emitter stays safely in Russian territory. 
On a peer state warfare level, such as in a conflict against NATO, this technology could not only protect Russian forces from kinetic attacks by weapons that use GPS, but it could also disrupt any allied operations that relies heavily on GPS for navigation today. Even logistics to support such an operation could also be negatively affected. 
Basically, the US military, and much of the world's transportation and commerce, runs on GPS. If anything else this incident in the Black Sea is a stark reminder of why the Pentagon needs to wean itself off this dependency as soon as possible. This possible event also doesn't take into account other avenues of attack a foreign power has to disrupt the GPS network, which includes cyber-intrusion or even attacking GPS satellites directly. Anti-satellite capabilities have become far more exotic, hard to detect, and more numerous than they once were. And even electronic warfare targeting GPS satellites doesn't have to be terrestrial in origin. Jamming tactics can be deployed in space between orbiting objects. 
Among all this uncertainty, one thing is for sure—during a major conflict, GPS will be a prime strategic target. Considering the technology to disrupt or spoof its signals is becoming ever more accessible, non-state actors will likely take advantage of it too for nefarious purposes. For instance, just think of this tactic's implications when it comes to a concept like self-driving cars. 
With all this in mind, preparing for a world where GPS connectivity is not guaranteed may not be convenient, but it may be entirely necessary. 

Wednesday, August 16, 2017

Tesla's Upcoming Electric Semi Truck Will Be Able to Drive Itself

Autopilot, big rig style.
As reported by The Verge: Tesla CEO Elon Musk has been teasing an electric semi truck for a while now, ahead of an official unveiling this fall. But a report in Reuters adds a new, if somewhat unsurprising, wrinkle to the mix: the Tesla big rig is probably going to have self-driving capabilities.
Reuters has seen emails between Tesla and the Nevada DMV where the two sides discussed “potential road tests” of the truck’s self-driving capabilities. The information also apparently describes Tesla’s desire to create long-haul electric semis that can drive themselves in “platoons,” potentially following behind a lead truck piloted by a human driver.
The idea that Tesla is working on incorporating self-driving technology into its upcoming semi truck falls in line with how aggressive the company has been at building the same tech into its consumer cars. Tesla offers semi-autonomous features on all of its current models in the form of Autopilot, which costs an additional $5,000 at the time of purchase. It also offers a $3,000 “full self-driving” option, which the company says will be activated once the software is ready. (Tesla claims that all of its cars are already equipped with the hardware necessary for full autonomy.)
What is surprising is that Tesla appears ready to test this technology. The state of Nevada is a likely partner, as it’s one of the few in the country that actually gives out licenses for autonomous vehicle testing. It was also the first state to allow self-driving big rigs to test in 2015 when Daimler acquired two AV licenses for its own Freightliner Inspiration Truck. Volvo is working on adding autonomous capabilities to its own trucking fleet, too.
Autonomy is also a common theme for the Silicon Valley companies that have dipped into the trucking world. In 2016, Uber acquired self-driving truck company Otto, which was led by a former high-profile employee of Google’s own self-driving project. (That employee is now currently at the center of a legal battle between Google’s parent company and Uber.) And Waymo, the company that blossomed out of Google’s self-driving car project, is working on its own self-driving truck program.
Tesla is planning an official reveal of the semi truck in September, so that’s when we’ll likely learn just how far the company wants to push this new part of its self-driving ambitions.

Monday, August 7, 2017

You Can Confuse Self-Driving Cars by Altering Street Signs

As reported by Engadget: While car makers and regulators are mostly worried about the possibility of self-driving car hacks, University of Washington researchers are concerned about a more practical threat: defacing street signs. They've learned that it's relatively easy to throw off an autonomous vehicle's image recognition system by strategically using stickers to alter street signs. If attackers know how a car classifies the objects it sees (such as target photos of signs), they can generate stickers that can trick the car into believing a sign really means something else. For instance, the "love/hate" graphics above made a computer vision algorithm believe a stop sign was really a speed limit notice.

It's easy to see the potential problems. You could make these stickers using a printer at home, so anyone from dedicated attackers to pranksters could try this. It might lead to a crash the moment someone alters the sign, but it could also produce long-term chaos -- picture your city closing a road until maintenance crews can scrape the stickers off a sign.

There are ways to fight this. The research team suggests using contextual information to verify that a sign is accurate. Why would you have a stop sign on the highway, or a high speed limit on a back road? We'd add that local governments could also install signs that use an anti-stick material, or put them out of reach. Whatever happens, something will have to change if passengers are going to trust self-driving cars' sign-reading abilities.

Of course another alternative would be to teach the AI systems to recognize sarcasm when they see it.




Thursday, August 3, 2017

Lockheed to Build $350M Satellite Factory Near Denver

As reported by the Gazette: Aerospace giant Lockheed Martin Corp. said Wednesday it plans to spend $350 million building a production facility for satellites at its Waterton Canyon campus in the Denver area that is designed to boost production capacity, reduce costs and accommodate a growing workforce.
Construction is scheduled to start by the end of the month and be completed in 2020 on a 266,000 square-foot building named Gateway Center that will be one of the largest production facilities on the campus. The facility will be large enough for the company to build five of its flagship A2100 satellites at the same time.
The new project is also designed to reassert the company in a sector that has become a lot more competitive, so-called microsatellites, which are often just a few meters wide.
U.S. Air Force officials talked in April at the Space Symposium in Colorado Springs about smaller, Swiss-Army-Knife-style microsatellites with multiple capabilities that can be quickly rocketed to the heavens to replace bigger satellites damaged in war.
Space "is a big place, but we plan to be a leader in it," said Rick Ambrose, executive vice president for Lockheed Martin's space systems business. "We're trying to develop a capability to handle any direction the market moves."
Plans for the new facility call for manufacturing, assembling and testing centers that are large enough to keep multiple production lines running at the same time, allowing the facility to produce large satellites as it is churning out smaller ones.
Lockheed executives are hoping that that will allow them to compete in the small-satellite market at the same time that they keep legacy production lines going, all under one roof.
By putting assembly and testing under the same roof, employees can simply roll a satellite down the hall versus moving it between buildings for testing. By taking the steps out of packing the satellite, moving it and unpacking it, the company will cut testing time from about two days to under an hour.
The building also will include a thermal vacuum chamber, meant to simulate the harsh environment of space, that will be used to test fully assembled satellites before they are attached to rockets. The facility is to include a stock of 3-D printers to produce the satellites' simpler components.
The construction project will create 1,500 jobs over three years. Lockheed Martin currently has about 8,600 employees in Colorado, including 4,000 at the Waterton Canyon complex. The company has added more than 750 jobs to its Colorado workforce since 2014 and has 350 job openings in Denver. In April, the Colorado Economic Development Commission approved $12.6 million in tax credits for the company in return for bringing 550 new jobs to Jefferson County over eight years.
The project will bolster Colorado's reputation as a leader in the space industry. Colorado has the nation's second-largest aerospace economy, employing 188,280 people and more than 400 companies, with a $3.4 billion annual payroll, according to the Colorado Space Coalition. Gov. John Hickenlooper said at the April Space Symposium that the state has ambitions to take over the top space economy ranking.
Besides Lockheed, seven other top aerospace contractors have significant operations in the state, including Boeing and Raytheon. Colorado is also home to the Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs and the University of Colorado's Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics in Boulder.
Lockheed has played a role in space operations since the 1950s, when its rockets were used to launch some of the first American satellites into orbit. Satellites are still a critical part of the company's business, and the project is designed to reassert the company in a sector that has become a lot more competitive.
Lockheed's business is being challenged by a cadre of well-heeled newcomers that have pledged to populate the lowest rung of Earth's orbit with microsatellites.
The global telecommunications investment firm SoftBank is spending $1.7 billion to combine Luxembourg-based Intelsat with Richard Branson-backed OneWeb, creating a satellite behemoth that seems singularly focused on smaller, cheaper models. Elon Musk's SpaceX is working to launch 4,425 small satellites into low Earth orbit by 2024.
These competitors contend that their microsatellites can provide a better signal in more places.
Then there is the Air Force's interest.
Air Force Space Command has been eyeing small satellites for years and more recently has taken serious steps to integrate them into future war plans.
While less capable than the school-bus sized spacecraft the military now has in orbit, the diminutive birds are cheaper to build and faster to launch than their complicated cousins.
With nations including Russia, China, Iran and North Korea developing or possessing anti-satellite capabilities, the small satellites could be used as stopgap measures to fill in for larger spacecraft damaged or destroyed in a war that reaches orbit, Space Command boss Gen. Jay Raymond has said.
It remains to be seen how Lockheed will fare. It specializes in taking on the kind of big projects that few companies have the scale to complete. The satellites Lockheed makes circle the planet much farther outside Earth's atmosphere, giving them a broader view of planet's surface. That means they have to be much more powerful, entailing longer production times and more expensive components.